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We study the dynamics and resulting score distribution of three-agent games where after each
competition a single agent wins and scores a point. A single competition is described by a triplet
of numbers p, t and q denoting the probabilities that the team with the highest, middle or lowest
accumulated score wins. We study the full family of solutions in the regime, where the number of
agents and competitions is large, which can be regarded as a hydrodynamic limit. Depending on the
parameter values (p, q, t), we find six qualitatively different asymptotic score distributions and we
also provide a qualitative understanding of these results. We checked our analytical results against
numerical simulations of the microscopic model and find these to be in excellent agreement. The
three agent game can be regarded as a social model where a player can be favored or disfavored
for advancement, based on his/her accumulated score. It is also possible to decide the outcome of
a three agent game through a mini tournament of two-agent competitions among the participating
players and it turns out that the resulting possible score distributions are a subset of those obtained
for the general three agent-games. We discuss how one can add a steady and democratic decline
rate to the model and present a simple geometric construction that allows one to write down the
corresponding score evolution equations for n-agent games.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of physical-mathematical modeling to describe
phenomena involving biological, social, political, econom-
ical and many other systems is becoming more relevant
and appreciated and has become an active area of re-
search. One reason this is possible is because all of these
systems generally admit a simple interpretation: a sum
of agents and a set of rules to describe their interaction
[2]-[4]. A reasonable approach to model the interactions
is to involve a finite number of agents at a time and via
the rules decide a winner which gains one unit of the at-
tribute used to compare the agents. The interaction may
represent, a competitive game for wealth [5]-[8], trophies
in sports [9],[10] , opinion dynamics [11]-[13], idea or ru-
mor propagation [14]-[16]. One can also contemplate the
emergence of social hierarchies from such models [17]-
[21]. On the other hand, one can contemplate situations
in which the game is not purely competitive and where
the weaker players might have a higher chance of winning.
Such models may admit solutions that can be useful for
making analogies with welfare systems, for example.
In this paper we analyze an extension of a recently
introduced two-agent model [17]-[21] to three-agent in-
teractions [22], where a single competition involves three
individuals at a time. The winner in a competition is
determined by three numbers (p, t, q) describing the win-
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ning probability of the agent with largest, middle and
lowest points, respectively. This model has been stud-
ied in detail for the three special cases (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)
and (0, 0, 1) in [22]. The aim of the present paper is to
study the model for the entire phase space of param-
eters, bounded only by the conservation of probability,
p+ t+ q = 1. We find that the full set of resulting solu-
tions contains qualitative differences that go beyond the
three special cases considered in [22]. Three-agent games
can be motivated by the observation that in social in-
teractions generally more than two agents are involved,
such as, in a job application or companies competing for
a contract.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section
II we present the model and its mathematical interpre-
tation, yielding the equations governing the point distri-
bution of the agents. In section II we also present a sim-
ple geometric method to generalize the model to n-agent
competitions. Section III is reserved to the study of the
solutions and the phase space, where the solutions are
also interpreted in terms of social structures in a society
of agents characterized by their scores. We also discuss
in that section the resolution of a subset of three-agent
games in terms of a mini-tournament involving two-agent
interactions. We finish the section by introducing a de-
cline rate for the agents to describe the loss of fitness due
to inactivity as advocated in [21]. The last section is re-
served for a short discussion and comments on possible
interesting extensions of the model.
2II. THE MODEL
In the model we would like to study a competition is
described as follows: We first pick three agents out of a
collection of N . We advance only one agent, based on
their accumulated points prior to the competition. Let
the first, second, and third agents have scores x, y and z,
respectively. Then, the agent with the largest score will
increase its score by one unit with probability p, the one
with the smallest score with probability q and the one in
the middle with probability t. The situation with equal
scores are evaluated on the basis of equal likelihood. The
initial condition is that at the beginning all agents start
with a zero score.
Assuming an ordering of points is made so that one
has x ≥ y ≥ z, we can cast the rules of the competition
as
(x > y > z) =⇒ (p, t, q) (1a)
(x = y > z) =⇒
(
p+ t
2
,
p+ t
2
, q
)
(1b)
(x > y = z) =⇒
(
p,
t+ q
2
,
t+ q
2
)
(1c)
(x = y = z) =⇒
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
(1d)
Here the lists on the right represent the winning proba-
bilities of the teams with points listed on the left. That
after every game one agent surely advances requires the
normalization of the probabilities
p+ t+ q = 1 . (2)
From this microscopic model we can read out the
change of the number of teams in a particular score range.
Let us denote by fx the fraction of teams having score x.
After a competition some teams might leave this region
and some teams might enter it by winning a competition
in each case. This suggests the following local conserva-
tion law,
dfx
dτ
=
∑
y,z
(fx−1 Wx−1,y,z − fx Wx,y,z) fy fz . (3)
HereWx,y,z denotes the probability that the team with x
points will win and the microscopic rules in Eq. (1) com-
pletely define what it is. The right hand side is cubic in
f , since we are picking three agents out of the collection,
and the probability to pick a team with a given point x
is fx.
Since
∑
x
fx = 1, (4)
it is immediate that equation Eq. (3) also implies, as it
should, the global conservation of the total number of
teams, as can be checked by performing a sum over x.
The time variable τ in Eq. (3) has an arbitrary scaling
which can be compensated by an overall factor in the def-
inition of W . The natural scale is such that the average
points of teams is given by,
x¯(τ) ≡
∞∑
x=0
x fx =
τ
3
, (5)
meaning that (on average) each team participates in a
single game during each round τ of games. As only one
of the participating teams in a game wins and advances
its score by one, Eq. (5) follows.
The presence of sums over the discrete indices on the
right hand side of Eq. (3), results in a coupled set of
differential equations. These can be further simplified by
defining
Fx ≡
x−1∑
x′=0
fx (6)
so that
fx = Fx+1 − Fx . (7)
Summing (3) over x we obtain
dFx
dτ
= −fx−1
∑
y,z
Wx−1,y,z fy fz , (8)
where the surface term at x = −1 has been ignored due
to the fact that no team can have negative points.
Now note that
fx−1
∑
y,x
Wx−1,y,z fy fz (9)
yields the probability that a team with score x − 1 will
win any possible choice of single competition with two
other teams. Since W depends on the ordering of points,
one can easily work out the sum from the rules, Eq. (1),
and Eq. (3) yielding
dFx
dτ
= −fx−1
[
pF 2x−1 + q(1 − Fx)
2 + 2tFx−1(1− Fx)
]
−2
(p+ t)
2
f2x−1Fx−1
−2
(t+ q)
2
f2x−1(1− Fx)
−
1
3
f3x−1 (10)
The terms on the first line of Eq. (10) represent the
bulk of interactions between three players with different
3F
x−1
F
x−1
1−F
x
1−F
x q
p
t
t
FIG. 1: The geometric representation of the sum in Eq. (9).
The filled circle represents the team with point x − 1. The
dashed and dot-dashed lines represent the number of teams
with points strictly less or greater than x− 1. The sum over
the areas will bring the bulk interaction whereas the sum over
the interfaces represent the cases where two teams have equal
points. The dot gives the term when all the teams have equal
points. This construct is easily generalized to n-agent games
as discussed in the text.
scores. The second and third lines represent the cases
where two players have identical scores x and the last
term represents the case when all the teams have equal
score.
Alternatively, the terms on the right hand side of
Eq. (10) can be obtained by invoking a geometric con-
struction: Imagine all the players aranged on a line or-
dered by their scores and let the x and y axis formed
in this way represent the possible opponents of a player
with a given score and let two perpendicular axes formed
in this way represent the possible opponents of a player
in the competition. The situation is represented graphi-
cally in Fig. 1, where the filled circle represents a player
with score x−1. The dashed and dot-dashed lines repre-
sent the number of opponents with scores strictly less or
greater than x − 1. The sum over the areas constitutes
the bulk of the match-ups in which all three players have
different scores, whereas the sum over the interfaces rep-
resent the cases where two teams have equal scores. The
dot gives the term when all the teams have equal scores.
In a microscopic simulation of the system the interface
terms are the most important only at early times, since
at the beginning all teams have zero points. In fact,
the most important contribution at the very beginning
is described by the f3x−1 term in Eq. (10). The effect
of this term is to create random imbalances in the point
distribution which in time will make the f2x−1 terms more
relevant. These imbalances are further emphasized by
the dynamics of the bulk terms as prescribed by the set
of winning probabilities (p, t, q). Therefore as time goes
by, in a thermodynamic limit where the number of teams
ranges to infinity, the majority of the contributions to
the dynamics will be governed by the bulk terms. On
the other hand as time goes by, almost every team will
accumulate a certain number of points which, in general,
will be larger than a single point. These considerations
allow one to go to a continuum limit where the differences
are expanded in terms of the derivatives. A first order
approximation, where one considers only the bulk terms,
results in the following,
∂F
∂τ
= −
∂F
∂x
G′(F ) , (11)
with
G′(F ) ≡ pF 2 + 2tF (1− F ) + q(1 − F )2 . (12)
As thoroughly studied in [21], the contribution of the
higher order derivative terms, that is the interface terms,
become negligible in the infinite time limit. We will refer
to this regime as the hydrodynamical limit.
The fact that in the hydrodynamical limit the inter-
face terms become negligible is also corraborated by the
fact that they do not contribute to the asymptotic time
dependence of the average score. In fact, we have
dx¯(τ)
dτ
=
d
dτ
∫ ∞
0
dx x f = −
∫ ∞
0
dx
∂F
∂τ
, (13)
and using Eq. (11) we find
dx¯(τ)
dτ
=
∫ ∞
0
dx
∂F
∂x
G′(F ) . (14)
Noting that F (x = ∞) = 1 and that in the large time
limit F (x = 0) = 0 (since a team with zero points will
happen with vanishing probability in the limit of large
times) we get
dx¯(τ)
dτ
=
∫ 1
0
dF G′(F ) =
p+ t+ q
3
=
1
3
. (15)
which implies that asymptotically x¯(τ) = τ/3.
A. Generalization to n+1-agent games
The geometric construction leading to Eq. (3) can eas-
ily be generalized to n+1-agent games. For simplicity, we
will consider the form of the equation only in the hydro-
dynamical limit, where one considers solely the bulk ef-
fects. One can easily generate the interface interactions,
if needed. The construction is simply picking a point
in an n-cube and splitting its volume by n − 1 planes
passing through this point that are orthogonal to each
other and also to the sides of the cube. As is well known,
4the number of resulting equivalent n-volumes is given by
the binomial coefficients. The dynamics of a n+1-agent
game, in the hydrodynamical limit, is therefore given by
∂F
∂τ
= −
∂F
∂x
G′(F ) , (16)
with
G′(F ) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− F )
kFn−k . (17)
The probabilities pk for the player with the kth highest
score to win obey of course
n∑
k=0
pk = 1 , (18)
and the mean score thus evolves as
x¯(τ) =
τ
n+ 1
. (19)
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL
In this section we first introduce the quantitative meth-
ods to analyze our model. This is followed by a study of
the full parameter range bound by p+ t+ q = 1 resulting
in a phase diagram of the possible types of solutions for
the model. For every regime in the phase diagram we
will present a numerical simulation of the microscopic
model and give a qualitative understanding of the hydro-
dynamic limit in that case. The score distributions are
next analysed in terms of their implied social structure
through ranking. A three agent-game can be obtained
by a mini-tournament among the players based on a two-
agent approach. We show that these cases constitutes a
curve on the phase plane, i.e. they form a subset of so-
lutions to the genuine three agent game. We finish this
section by discussing the effect of adding a decline rate
for the agents.
A. The scaling Ansatz
The form of the differential equation for F , Eq. (11),
suggests a scaling solution ansatz of the form
F (x, τ)→ F (z ≡
x
τ
) . (20)
which yields
dF
dz
[−z +G′(F )] = 0 . (21)
The scaling equation thus obtained means that one ei-
ther has F = constant or G′(F ) = z. The boundary
conditions are F (z = 0) = 0 (since in the infinite time
limit the probability to have a team with zero points van-
ishes) and F (z = 1) = 1 (because the maximum possible
points a team can accumulate in time τ is simply τ in our
normalization of the time variable). Furthermore, since
the definition of F means that it has to be an increasing
function of x and hence z we have either dF/dz = 0 or
dF/dz > 0.
For a three-agent game G′(F ) is quadratic. Thus
one can generally expect regions of parameters where
d2F/dz2 is positive or negative which implies one can
also expect a critical point of a crossover where d2F/dz2
vanishes.
On the other hand, the possibility of patching solu-
tions of the two mentioned forms already suggests that
the derivative of F need not be continuous. In fact, F
itself can have discontinuities, resulting in Dirac-delta
singularities in its derivative, the score distribution func-
tion and implying that a finite fraction of teams evolves
with the same winning rate. At this point we would
like to reemphasize that the contribution of the interface
and hence the higher order derivative terms will tend to
smooth out these discontinuities but that their overall ef-
fect is negligible in the inifinite time limit. We refer the
interested reader to [21], where the minute effect of these
terms were studied in detail for the two-agent version of
the model presented.
The main problem, therefore, is to unambiguously ob-
tain the solution for any given z in the hydrodynamical
limit. This is most readily carried out by noting that
Eq. (11) is in the form of a hyperbolic conservation law
and applying the theory of weak solutions of hyperbolic
conservation laws, also know as the method of character-
istics. In the next subsection we therefore turn to a brief
description of the method of characteristics and then pro-
ceed to obtain the solution of Eqs. (11) and (12) for the
full parameter range p+q+t = 1. For a more detailed ac-
count of the theory of hyperbolic PDEs and conservation
laws, we refer the reader to [1] and references therein.
B. The Method of Characteristics
We are looking for a solution of
∂F
∂τ
= −
∂F
∂x
G′(F ) , (22)
subject to the initial condition
F (x, 0) =
{
0 x < 0,
1 x ≥ 0.
(23)
Given (22), we define its characteristics as the curves
x(τ) in the x − τ plane on which F (x, τ) remains con-
stant. It can be shown that these curves are given by the
characteristic equation
5x(t) = x0 + τG
′(F (x0, 0)) (24)
and thus G′(F (x0, 0)) is the speed of the characteristic
emerging from the point x0.
An implicit solution can therefore be found as
F (x, τ) = F (x0, 0), where for a given (x, τ), x0 is de-
termined from the characteristics, as defined in (24).
Depending on the initial conditions and the form of
G′(F ), the characteristics can intersect, giving rise to
multiple-valued points that are resolved by discontinu-
ities (shocks), spread out giving rise to continuous solu-
tions (rarefaction waves), or do both. Even with smooth
initial data the solution can develop discontinuities in a
finite time.
One therefore seeks weak solutions, which for our pur-
poses can be defined as solutions to the ”viscous” equa-
tion
∂F
∂τ
+
∂F
∂x
G′(F ) = ǫ
∂2F
∂x2
, (25)
in the limit that ǫ → 0+. It is well-known that this
prescription is equivalent to seeking solutions such that
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
χ(x, τ)
[
∂F
∂τ
+G′(F )
∂F
∂x
]
dτ dx = 0 (26)
for any continuously differentiable function χ(x, τ) with
compact support [1]. This condition allows one to ob-
tain weak solutions without having to solve the ”viscous”
equation.
1. Application to the two-agent game
In order to illustrate the method of characteristics we
consider first the two-player game. In this case we have
G′(F ) = q + (p− q)F , (27)
with p + q = 1 and the same initial data, Eq. (23).
The speed of the characteristics are thus G′(0) = q and
G′(1) = p.
For p > q the characteristics spread out and we have
F (x, τ) = 1 for x > pτ and F (x, τ) = 0 for x < qτ , while
in the region qτ ≤ x ≤ pτ the weak solution results in
G′(F ) =
x
τ
≡ z . (28)
In terms of the scaling variable z we therefore find
F (z) =
z − q
p− q
(29)
for q ≤ z ≤ p.
The interpretation is that the strongest teams are be-
coming stronger, increasing their scores at a rate p, while
the weakest teams can only increase their scores at a
lower rate q. The score rate of the majority of teams lies
in between these extreme cases and turns out to be uni-
formly distributed which is mandated by the fact that in
this case G′(F ) is linear.
For p < q, the characteristics intersect. This means
that once a team starts winning a series of games its
increased score makes it less likely to win against most
of the weaker teams, causing its score rate to decline. In
the limit of very large scores, the average score rate of
a team is 1/2 (since only half of the teams participating
in a round of matches win) and fluctuations around this
average become increasingly less (of the order of τ−1/2),
leading to the shock solution in the infinite time, i.e.
hydrodynamical, limit.
For any G(F), the shock speed is given by the Rankine-
Hugoniot jump condition [1],
v =
G(Fl)−G(Fr)
Fl − Fr
=
∆G
∆F
, (30)
where Fl and Fr are the values of F immediately to the
left and right of the discontinuity.
For the two-player game, when q > p, Fl = 0 and
Fr = 1, while G(F ) = qF + (p− q)F
2 /2 and the result
v = 1/2 indeed follows.
C. The Three-Player Game
Depending on p, t, and q, the function G(F ) is not nec-
essarily convex in the interval F ∈ [0, 1] meaning that
G′(F ) is not a monotonously increasing or decreasing
function as was the case in the two-player game. As
we have mentioned before whenever G′(F ) = z is part of
the solution one can expect F to be concave up or down
in z. When G′(F ) is non-monotonous this implies that
F has discontinuities, i.e. shocks. For general, p, t, and
q, the resulting solution of F turns out to contain a con-
tinuous segment given by G′(F ) = z as well as a single
discontinuity. We find the following regimes
• C−: p > t ≥ q and τ < 1/3,
• C0: t = 1/3 > q,
• C+: t > 1/3 and p ≥ t,
• C+S : p < t and q ≤ 1/3,
• S: q > 1/3 > p,
• C−S : q > t and p > 1/3.
In this suggestive notation, which will be justified be-
low, regimes C+ and C− represent a solution F which
is concave up/down in z respectively. The regime C0
6is the interface between the concave up and down solu-
tions and has a vanishing second derivative. The label S
means that there is a shock form in the solution. So the
pure S regime means that the solution has the form of
a single shock. That is, a step function solution for F .
The corresponding profiles are shown in Figs. (2)-(7).
The solution in all six regions can thus be written in
the general form
F (x, τ) =


0 z < zl,
Φ(z) zl ≤ z ≤ zr,
1 z > zr,
(31)
where, again, z = x/τ . We also define the roots Φ±(z)
of the equation
G′(Φ) = z (32)
as
Φ±(z) =
q − τ ±
[
(q − τ)2 + (1− 3τ)(z − q)
]1/2
1− 3τ
(33)
Note in particular that
Φ±(q) =
q − τ ± |q − τ |
1− 3τ
(34)
and
Φ±(p) =
q − τ ± |p− τ |
1− 3τ
(35)
In regimes C−, C0 and C+ the function G′(F ) in-
creases monotonously from q to p as F goes from 0 to
1. This results in a continuous solution for q ≤ z ≤ p. In
regions with the label S on the other hand, G′(F ) does
not have a monotonous behavior and from the character-
istic construction we see regions that are multiple-valued.
These cases are resolved by the Maxwell (or equal-area)
construction, as we will describe below, which is a con-
sequence of the weak solution prescription, Eq. (26)[1].
Region C−: p > 1/3 > τ ≥ q
Here we have Φ+(q) = 0, Φ+(p) = 1 and the solution
F (x, τ) is given by Eq. (31) with Φ(z) = Φ+(z), zl = q
and zr = p.
To understand the structure emerging from this solu-
tion, let us recall that the population density of agents
f is given by the first derivative of F . The fact that F
is a concave down and monotonously increasing function
for this case implies that most of the agents are in the
lower point range. Thus this situation makes a contrast
to the two-agent game in the sense that there this dis-
tribution is uniform. One can argue that this is related
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F(
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Regime C-
p=0.7   t=0.2   q=0.1
FIG. 2: A representative graph for the solution in regime
C−. The circles represent the data from the simulation of the
microscopic model. The solid line is the analytical solution.
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FIG. 3: A representative graph for the solution in regime
C0. The circles represent the data from the simulation of the
microscopic model. The solid line is the analytical solution.
to the fact that in this case of the three agent-game the
ordering of winning probabilities constitutes a pure rich-
get-richer competition and therefore once a team wins a
game it actually beats two lower rank teams. This is in
agreement with the fact the the middle team wins with
a probability less than 1/3 and gives rise to the asym-
metric first derivative at F = 0 and F = 1. The role of
the value of t relative to 1/3 will become clearer when we
study the region C0 below.
At this point we would like to introduce two useful
quantities in assessing the score distributions emerging
from the three agent game. The ratio of the number of
the poorest agents to the richest agents is related to the
score distribution and is given by
7ω ≡
f(zl)
f(zr)
=
F ′(zl)
F ′(zr)
. (36)
Another useful quantity is the length of the score re-
gion over which the agents are distributed and which is
associated with the total score shared by them,
σ ≡
zr − zl
1
. (37)
Since these metrics characterize the distributions of the
score of agents within their society of players, we will
refer to these metrics as ”social” indices. In the solution
regime C− we are considering here they are given by
ωC− =
√
1 +
(1− 3t)(p− q)
(q − t)2
> 1 , (38a)
σC− = p− q . (38b)
That ωC− > 1 shows the bias in the distribution as op-
posed to the two agent game. This bias is most extreme
in the special case where q = t ⇒ p = 1 − 2t, where Φ
becomes
Φ(z) =
[
z − t
1− 3t
]1/2
(39)
and the score distribution ω diverges as a simple pole.
This means that a great majority of the agents are near
the poorest ones.
Region C0: p > t = 1/3 > q
We again have zl = q, zr = p and Φ(z) = Φ+(z), which
simplifies to
Φ(z) =
z − q
p− q
(40)
for q ≤ z ≤ p.
Note that the resulting profile is qualitatively the same
as the one for the two player game with q < p. This is so,
because the middle team in a three player set has a 1/3
chance of winning the game and thus the team’s score
does not induce any bias towards either to the rich or
poor side of the spectrum of agents. So 1/3 of the games
can be considered to be completely redundant given p >
t = 1/3 > q. Thus being in the middle of a triplet of
agents is just like a pure random walk. In this situation
the social indices we have introduced before become
ωC0 = 1 , (41a)
σC0 = p− q . (41b)
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FIG. 4: A representative graph for the solution in regime
C+. The circles represent the data from the simulation of the
microscopic model. The solid line is the analytical solution.
that is, the number of the richest agents is the same as
the number of poorest agents. Note that in this case the
number of agents with any given score is the same. This
is related to the fact that in a three-agent game G′(F ) is
at most quadratic and that F has to be increasing.
Region C+: p ≥ t > 1/3 > q
We still have zl = q, zr = p and Φ(z) = Φ+(z). The
social indices become
ωC− =
√
1−
| 1− 3t | (p− q)
(q − t)2
< 1 ,
σC− = p− q . (42)
On the line t = p⇒ q = 1− 2t, we have in particular
Φ(z) = 1−
[
1 +
z − q
1− 3q
]1/2
. (43)
In this extreme case we have ωC− = 0 meaning that the
majority of the agents are condensed near the rich side
z = p. Note that the vanishing of ωC− is as that of a
power-law.
We therefore see the common property of the regions
without a shock front: In all three regimes one has the
ordering of probabilities p ≥ t ≥ q yielding a generally
competitive game. The relative position of t with respect
to 1/3 determines whether one has a mild accumulation
of the agents towards the rich or poor side. When t =
1/3 this ratio is equal. We present representative graphs
of the regimes C−, C0 and C− in Figures 2, 3 and 4,
respectively. The figures compare for a certain choice
of parameters, both the score distribution obtained from
simulation of the microscopical competitions as well as
our analytical results in the hydrodynamical limit.
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FIG. 5: A representative graph for the solution in the regime
C+
S
. The circles represent the data from the simulation of the
microscopic model. The solid line is the analytical solution.
The Maxwell construction which determines the location of
the shock requires that the areas A1 and A2 be equal.
Region C+S : t > p and q < 1/3
In this parameter regime G′(F ) is not a monotonously
increasing function in the interval [0, 1]. This leads to a
formation of a shock front at zr, where the latter is de-
termined by the Maxwell equal area construction: The
general solution in this region is again of the form (31)
with zl = q. but zr the location of the shock is deter-
mined by the equal area rule
G′[Φ(zr)] =
G[1]−G[Φ(zr)]
1− Φ(zr)
(44)
After a little bit of algebra one finds that
Φ(zr) =
1
2
1− 3q
3t− 1
(45)
and using G′[Φ(zr)] = zr we obtain
zr = q +
1
4
3q − 1
1− 3t
(4t− q − 1) (46)
Thus we see that at zr we have a discontinuity that
jumps from F = Φ(zr) to F = 1. The resulting Φ profile
is Φ(z) = Φ+(z), for zl ≤ z ≤ zr followed by a shock
discontinuity at zr.
For a single discontinuity, as above, it is clear that
due to the equal area construction resulting in the ver-
tical segment, the area under the graph G′(F ) remains
unchanged and one has
1
3
= G(1)−G(0) =
∫ 1
0
G′(F ) dF
= [1− Φ(zr)]G
′[Φ(zr)] +
∫ Φ(zr)
0
G′(F ) dF, (47)
independent of p, q and t, since it is the rate at which
the total number of points accumulate as each team par-
ticipates in a three player game. In fact, the equal area
construction resolves a region with multiple valued points
by a discontinuity such that the total conserved quantity
remains unchanged. Thus for a single discontinuity this
construction is equivalent to conserving the quantity over
the whole domain as utilized in [22].
On the other hand, when one has four or higher agent
games, depending on the winning probabilities, the re-
sulting profiles can have multiple shocks separated by
rarefaction waves. In that case a global conservation
constraint would not be sufficient to determine all shock
locations, and one would have to resort to applying the
equal area construction to each region where the profile
is multiple valued.
One can qualitatively understand the reason for a
shock front to the right of the wealth span as follows.
First of all, due to the fact that t > p, having the high-
est score in a competition is a disadvantage since a team
in the middle of a triplet is favored. This results in a
sort of deceleration mechanism for the propagation rate
of teams with high scores and consequently a fraction of
the total agents condense at the high score side of the
spectrum: they are the richest agents in the society. It is
clear that such a case is an attractor solution since when
it is formed it is not destroyed. That is, if an agent in
this shock wins a game it will be disfavored in the future
games resulting in a loss of its point. Conversely, if an
agent in the shock looses a game it will be favored in
a future game over a team in the shock resulting in its
return to the shock region.
The region with a continuous F to the left of the shock
can be understood easily if we remember that q < 1/3
implies q < (t + p)/2, regardless of how p and q are
ordered. Let us consider a game with two teams from the
shock region and one from below, such a game constitutes
a great majority of possible types of games if there is
a shock region. In this case the probability of a win
for the teams in the shock is given by (t + p)/2 and for
the other by q. This means that the lower point team
is disfavored altogether and the criterion for this is just
q < 1/3, resulting in a continuous population density for
regions below the shock.
Due to the discontinuity in F one has to exercise a
little more care in implementing the social index ω we
have introduced before. Since in this case we have
F (z) = Φ+(z) + [1− Φ+(zr)] Θ(z − zr)
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FIG. 6: A representative graph for the solution in the regime
S. The circles represent the data from the simulation of the
microscopic model. The solid line is the analytical solution.
The Maxwell reconstruction to determine the location of the
shock requires that the areas A1 and A2 are equal.
there will be a strong singularity in ω
ωC+
S
=
const
δ(0)
, (48a)
σC+
S
=
4t− q − 1
4
(
1− 3q
3t− 1
)
. (48b)
So ω vanishes much more strongly (and for all parame-
ters) then in the particular case presented for the regime
C+ where the vanishing was determined by a simple zero.
One, if willing, can define a better index which does not
use the derivative of F . For instance, considering the
agents in the left/right third of the distributed wealth
zr − zl as poor (slower moving agents) and rich (faster
moving agents), respectively, a smeared index can be de-
fined as
ω˜ ≡
F (zl +
σ
3 )
1− F (zr −
σ
3 )
, (49)
which we will not pursue here.
A representative graph including an exact numerical sim-
ulation of the microscopic model and the analytical con-
struction is presented in Fig. 5.
Region S: q ≥ 1/3 > p
In this region G′[F ] is monotonously decreasing with
F . The profile Φ is obtained from the equal area con-
struction, resulting in a discontinuity at z∗ that covers
the whole interval [0, 1] of F , i.e. a unit step. The shock
speed is found to be 1/3 so that zl = zr = z
∗ = 1/3. Note
that when p > t and p ≤ 1/3, G′[F ] is not monotonously
decreasing anymore in F . However the equal area con-
struction still leads to a discontinuity at z covering the
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
z
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
F(
z)
Regime C-S
A1
A2
p=0.5   t=0.1   q=0.4
FIG. 7: A representative graph for the solution in the regime
C−
S
. The circles represent the data from the simulation of the
microscopic model. The solid line is the analytical solution.
The Maxwell reconstruction to determine the location of the
shock requires that the areas A1 and A2 are equal.
whole interval of F so that the shock speed is again 1/3
and thus z∗ = 1/3.
The social indices become ωS = 1 and σS = 0, reem-
phasizing the fact that in this case all agents share the
same wealth.
The meaning of a single shock becomes clear if we note
that q > p impliess that the lower score teams will even-
tually catch up with the teams with highest scores. The
other condition q > 1/3 implies q > (t+p)/2 which means
that the lower rank teams will also be able to catch up
with a shock to the right of the wealth span. Note that
q > p does not necessarily imply q > t, although there
is a subregion consistent with this condition. The condi-
tion q > (t + p)/2 ensures that even if t > p and t > q,
whenever there is a shock to the right as argued in our
discussion of the region C+S , the lower rank teams will
eventually reach that shock resulting in a single discon-
tinuous front for the solution.
A representative graph including an exact numerical sim-
ulation of the microscopic model and the analytical con-
struction is presented in Fig. 6.
Region C−S : q > t and p > 1/3
In this parameter regime G′(F ) is not a monotonously
increasing function in the interval [0, 1]. This leads to
a formation of a shock front at zl, where the latter is
determined by the Maxwell equal area construction: The
general solution in this region is again of the form (31)
with zr = p. The location zl of the shock is determined
by the equal area rule as
G′[Φ(zl)] =
G[Φ(zl)]−G[0]
Φ(zl)
(50)
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with
Φ(zl) =
3
2
q − t
1− 3t
(51)
so that
zl = q −
3
4
(q − t)2
1− 3t
. (52)
The resulting profile is given by Φ(z) = Φ+(z), for
zl ≤ z ≤ zr preceded by a shock discontinuity at zl that
jumps from F = 0 to F = Φ(zl).
The qualitative analysis of this solution is very similar
to our previous discussion of regimes with a shock. The
condition q > t means that the lower rank teams will
catch up with the middle rank teams. The condition
p > 1/3 gives p > (t + p)/2 meaning that higher point
teams can decouple from this region and constitute a
continuous solution to the right of the shock.
The social indices become
ωC−
S
= const× δ(0) (53)
σC−
S
= p− q +
3
4
(q − t)2
1− 3t
(54)
Again ωC− diverges much more strongly (and for all pa-
rameters) as opposed to the simple pole divergence we
have seen for the particular case of parameters in regime
ωC− .
A representative graph including an exact numerical sim-
ulation of the microscopic model and the analytical con-
struction is presented in Fig. 7.
In Fig. 8 we have graphically combined all the regimes
in a phase diagram on the p+q+t = 1 plane . The vertices
p, q and t of the triangle correspond to the cases p = 1,
q = 1 and t = 1, respectively, while the edges pt, tq, and
qp, correspond to q = 0, p = 0 and t = 0, respectively.
The points (p, q, t) with p constant correspond to lines
parallel to the edge tq, etc., and the dot shown represents
the point (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
D. Social Structures Emerging From Different
Regimes
If we regard the agent game as a social model where
agents compete for an (unlimited) commodity through
three-way competitions, we see that, depending on
(p, q, t), different wealth structures emerge asymptoti-
cally. Following an analogue of the naming scheme pre-
sented in [21], we can classify the resulting agent societies
in terms of their wealth distributions as
• Regime C−: Middle-class society with mild hierar-
chy.
• Regime C0: Pure middle-class society.
−
C0
p
C
CS
t
S
−
q
C+
CS
+
FIG. 8: The phase diagram of the three-agent game presented
on the plane p + t + q = 1. The blue/green areas represent
the regimes with positive/negative concavity of F . The red
area is where the solution is a single shock wave at z = τ/3.
The regions C+
S
and C−
S
are represented by the dark shades of
blue/green. The crossover line from C− to C+ is emphasized
with a yellow line. The thin black curve represent the resolu-
tion of a three-agent game via a mini tournament between the
three players in terms of two-agent competitions as described
in text.
• Regime C+: Middle-class society with mild anti-
hierarchy.
• Regime C+S : Anti-hierarchical society.
• Regime S: Egalitarian society.
• Regime C−S : Hierarchical society.
In all regions without a shock, the agents are dis-
tributed along the same wealth span p − q. The reason
we endow all of them with a middle-class structure is due
to the fact that F is a continuous function and thus has
no Dirac-delta singularities in its derivative, i.e. there
are no condensations of agents at the highest or lowest
points.
The regimes with a shock on the other hand constitute
genuinely different societies where some agents condense
at a given point accumulation rate. This implies analo-
gies to social structures where there is a frozen class.
The somewhat abused use of (anti-)hierarchy means in
our context that the condensation happens in the (up-
per)lower part of the society. The use of the adjective
egalitarian when all agents increase their points at the
same rate is somewhat more natural.
The regimes with a shock have another common fea-
ture: unlike the regimes without a shock the parameters
do not obey p ≥ t ≥ q; that is the game is not purely
competitive. For instance, if the lower rank agents are
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favored over the higher rank ones, such as in regime S,
we might make an analogy with a sort of welfare system
which in the long run results in an equal wealth distri-
bution. In a regime where the middle rank agents are
favored over the higher rank ones, regime C+S is sugges-
tive of affirmative action. In regime C−S the lower rank is
favored over the middle rank and the ultimate outcome
is to coalesce these regimes resulting in a large volume of
poor agents. This constitutes suggestions of affirmative
action where the middle class is the sole source of wealth
flux to the lower class. An upper-class also persists in
this regime and the resulting structure can therefore be
called very hierarchical.
However, one must be careful in that a particular p, t, q
ordering does not necessarily ensure that the solution will
be in a unique regime, as evident from our analysis of
the different regimes. For regimes with a shock, we show
below whether a particular ordering resides in a single
regime or not
1. p > q > t: Single regime: C−S .
2. q > p > t: Two regimes: S or C−S .
3. q > t > p: Single regime: S.
4. t > q > p: Two regimes: S or C+S .
5. t > p > q: Single Regime: C+S .
An inspection of the permutation index of the orderings
relative to the pure competitive ordering p ≥ t ≥ q allows
us to identify if an ordering defines a single region or not.
This is given by
Πo = (−1)
Ro (55)
with Πo defining the permutation index of the regime
with a shock relative to the ones without and Ro is the
number of regimes defined by the ordering: one or two.
E. Resolution in terms of a two agent game
A three-agent game will be characterized by the set
of numbers (p, t, q) which controls the outcome of a sin-
gle competition. However it is possible to resolve a sub-
set of genuine three-agent games in terms of two-agent
games. The simplest such approach is to let each three
teams play a single two-agent game with each other, that
is to have a tournament. All the two-agent games in
this tournament are decided based on how many tourna-
ments the agents have won before. That is, during the
tournament the tournament wins of each team is kept
constant but they accumulate match points depending
on the tournament wins The winner of the tournament
is the agent with largest number of accumulated match
points. As usual ties are decided on the basis of equal
likelihood. A two agent game is characterized by two
numbers p2 + q2 = 1, with p2 denoting the probability
that the team with the larger number of points, out of
the two, wins. During the tournament the tournament
wins of each team is, as we have pointed out, kept con-
stant but they accumulate match points and the winner
of the tournament is the agent with largest number of
accumulated match points. As usual ties are decided on
the basis of equal likelihood. A simple analysis yields
the following probabilities to emerge as the winner out
of such a tournament
p = p22 +
1
3
p2q2 (56a)
t =
4
3
p2q2 (56b)
q = q22 +
1
3
p2q2 (56c)
These are represented in the phase diagram for the
three-agent game in Fig. (8). As one might expect, for
p2 > 1/2 one is in the C
− regime. The value p2 = 1/2
means that p = t = q = 1/3 and we have a completely
random game represented by a shock. For values of p2
less than 1/2 the shock remains as in the two-agent game
and in the terminology of the three-agent phase diagram
we are in regime S. Note that the C−S , C
0, C+ and C+S
regimes are absent in this version of the three agent game.
F. Adding a decline rate for agents
An interesting extension of the model we presented is
to allow some sort of mechanism with which agents lose
points. This for instance can account for the realistic
observation that through inaction competitors loose fit-
ness. A simple realization of this is to allow a steady
and democratic decline rate for agents, as advocated and
studied in detail for two-agent games in [21]. Such a de-
cline rate for agents will simply result in the following
generalization of (11)
∂F
∂τ˜
= −
∂F
∂x˜
[r +G′(F )] . (57)
where r is the rate with which agents loose points.
This new form of the equation is entirely related to the
old one by a Galilean transformation
τ˜ = τ (58a)
x˜ = x+ rτ (58b)
One can therefore use the solutions of the old equa-
tion (11) to generate solutions for the new one by just
left translating the x axis. This is analogous to just
left shifting the z variable by r. However even though
the equation is Galilean invariant the boundary condi-
tions are not: we do not allow for negative points for
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agents. Therefore the recipe for generating solutions for
the advance-decline model is to take a solution without
r, left translate the z axis by r and discard the solution
for z < 0. This will possibly generate condensation of
agents at zero points, and hence a shock at z = 0.
Presented this way, adding a decline rate is straightfor-
ward and the regimes we have presented will in general
double in number. Whether a shock at z = 0 exists or
not can easily be determined by comparing r and zl. If
r > zl there will be a shock at z = 0, if not the solution
will qualitatively look the same.
As far as the decline rate is concerned, the most in-
teresting regime is C+S where there is originally a shock
at zr, so in this case if r < q we will have two shocks.
For C−S the effect of r is qualitatively immaterial since
the shock is already to the left of the curve. This is also
valid for regime S.
In terms of the social classification we have presented,
the effect of r is to possibly introduce hierarchy into the
society.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have studied the complete dynamics of the three-
agent game in the hydrodynamical limit of large scores
and large number of games played, by noting that the
cumulative score distribution obeys a hyperbolic conser-
vation law PDE, and using the method of characteristics
to obtain analytical solutions.
The applications of this model to realistic social data
could be one the most interesting ones. The effect of
a policy reminiscent of some sort of affirmative action
can also be applied in our model in that it admits three
players.
One possible extension of our model that has poten-
tially interesting implications within the competitive sub-
space is the merger option of two lower ranking agents in
a game. That is two agents combining forces against the
more powerful opponent. In doing so they should both
increase their probabilities of winning in comparison to
the case without merger.
Another interesting avenue is to increase the number
of attributes in choosing a winner. This will in general
mean that the rate equations we have used will involve
a multi-dimensional gradient representing the different
attributes. These extensions are currently under study.
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